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INTRODUCTION
This Article analyzes the concept of “national referendum” and the
relationship between representatives and citizens in Japan. In Japan,
there is no provision for a referendum on a national level except by a
constitutional amendment and a special statute in national parliament,
which applies only at the local public entity level. Unlike at the national
level, the Japanese Constitution allows local governments to have a
referendum and recall system. For example, in Okinawa Prefecture,
where a United States’ (U.S.) base is located, the local government held
a referendum that asked whether voters wanted the U.S. base to stay or
relocate. This referendum constituted a review of the Japan-U.S. Status
of Forces Agreement.
As Japanese constitutional studies have explained, a national
referendum on specific issues is permissible only if it does not possess
binding power. First, the Japanese Constitution declares that only
parliament, known as the Diet, possesses law-making power. Thus,
representatives may abuse the outcome of a national referendum by
claiming they are acting in the name of the people through plebiscite.
Additionally, the Japanese Constitution does not contain a provision
that permits a recall system to discharge parliamentary representatives.
Such representatives work for all Japanese people and do not depend
on voters in their electoral districts.
The Japanese Constitution is founded on the notion of popular
sovereignty. Popular sovereignty is a concept derived from the French
Constitutions of 1791 and 1793. The French Constitution of 1791
established popular sovereignty, which is the principle that political
power lies with the people and government derives its authority from
the people’s consent through their elected representatives.
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Significantly, the French Constitution of 1793 emphasized the power of
the voters in a government founded on popular sovereignty. Guided by
this historical principle, once representatives are chosen, they work for
all of the people, independent of the will of their electoral district.
If a national referendum is allowed, the Japanese people may
question the continued existence of popular sovereignty, wherein, the
people, decide their destiny and take responsibility for their choices. In
reality, however, ordinary people do not consider politics an integral
part of their daily lives. Nowadays, a strong ruling party makes the
important decisions without deliberation. In Japan, democracy is in
crisis. Theoretically, the Japanese Constitution is set up so that
parliament reflects the will of the people. Japanese constitutional
scholars have proposed semi representative and sociological
representative systems to connect politics with citizens. Both forms of
representation overlap and should aim to reflect the will of the people
to the parliament. Under the semi representative system, the
representatives’ will should match that of the people. Under the
sociological representative system, the representatives are legitimized
through elections and the people should be empowered to choose a
political party that reflects their beliefs through partisan distribution in
the parliament.
In the 1970s, scholar Yasuo Sugihara analyzed the notion of
“people” under popular sovereignty and addressed the gap between the
will of the people and that of their representatives. He argued that the
concept of sovereignty may work as a political ideology under popular
sovereignty in the Japanese Constitution. Sugihara’s analysis has
helped ordinary people realize that they hold political power and that
politics should be an integral part of their daily lives. As a prominent
French constitutional scholar in Japan, Professor Yōichi Higuchi,
however, continues to doubt the reality of direct democracy.
I. NATIONAL REFERENDUMS UNDER THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION
This Article reviews the possibility and theory of the national
referendum under the Japanese Constitution. Under globalization, the
internationalization of nations restricts the sovereign state’s
discretionary power: the government’s ability to make decisions for
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itself. 1 Similarly, the narrowed scope of national authority limits what
“we the people” can decide today. We can no longer make decisions
for our future like we used to. Under the Japanese Constitution,
sovereignty resides with the power and authority of the people. 2
Authority refers to democratic legitimacy and power derives from the
voters who choose their representatives in parliament, the National
Diet. 3 The Emperor has no power or authority; his power is limited to
a ceremonial and symbolic role. 4
A. Limited Sovereignty and the Representatives’ Relationship with
“We the People”
Article 43 of the Japanese Constitution states that the
representatives are expected to work for all of the people. 5 This means
that representatives should be independent from the will of the voters
in electoral districts.
Once electoral districts vote on their
representatives, those representatives become members of parliament
and should reflect the integrated will of all of the people. 6 The Japanese
Constitution’s Preamble indicates that it implements indirect
democracy but with a few provisions for a direct voting system, namely

1. See NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION] 39-43 (6th ed. 2015)
(Japan). This book is one of the most famous books on the Japanese
constitution. Nobuyoshi Ashibe, a professor at The University of Tokyo, is
specialized in American constitutional law. See Lawyer Group Charges Abe with
TIMES
(Feb.
14,
2014),
Constitutional
Ignorance,
JAPAN
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/02/14/national/lawyer-group-charges-abewith-constitutional-ignorance/#.XlsZxy2ZM0p. See also TOSHIHIKO NONAKA ET AL.,
KENPŌ I [CONSTITUTION I] 90-94 (Yuhikaku 2012) (Japan) [hereinafter NONAKA ET
AL., KENPŌ I]; HIDEKI MOTO ET AL., KENPŌ KŌGI [LECTURE OF CONSTITUTION]
(Nihon Hyoronsha 2018) [hereinafter MOTO, KENPŌ].
2. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], pmbl. (Japan); ASHIBE, supra
note 1, at 41. See SHIGENORI MATSUI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: A CONTEXTUAL
ANALYSIS 38-41 (2011).
3. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], pmbl., art. 43 (Japan). See
ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 39; MATSUI, supra note 2, at 38-41.
4. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 1 (Japan).
5. Id. art. 43 (Japan); TOSHIHIKO NONAKA ET AL., KENPŌ II [CONSTITUTION II]
59-64 (Yuhikaku 2012) (Japan) [hereinafter NONAKA ET AL., KENPŌ II].
6. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 43 (Japan).
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a constitutional amendment, 7 “[a] special law, applicable only to one
local public entity,” 8 and a judge’s referendum. 9
The current Constitution was promulgated in November 1946 and
has never been amended. 10 The Constitution of the Japanese Empire
(Meiji Constitution) was replaced with the current Japanese
Constitution, which transferred power from the emperor to the people. 11
To understand this change in the view of sovereignty, consider an
American constitutional law scholar Professor Nobuyoshi Ashibe’s
explanation that constituent power lies outside of the Constitution and
differs from the power to amend the Constitution. 12 The power to
amend the Constitution is an institutionalized constituent power. 13
Professor Ashibe argues it is impossible to amend the Constitution’s
designation of sovereignty and its provisions on human rights and
peace. 14 Under the current Constitution, Japanese people reserve the
power to make constitutional amendments, but they have never
7. See id. pmbl., art. 96. “Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by
the Diet, . . . and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, . . . at a
special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify.” Id. art. 96.
8. Id. art. 95 (“A special law, applicable only to one local public entity, cannot
be enacted by the Diet without the consent of the majority of the voters of the local
public entity concerned, obtained in accordance with law.”).
9. Id. art. 79(2) (“The appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court shall be
reviewed by the people at the first general election of members of the House of
Representatives following their appointment, and shall be reviewed again at the first
general election of members of the House of Representatives after a lapse of ten (10)
years, and in the same manner thereafter.”).
10. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan); Adam P. Liff & Ko
Maeda, Why Shinzo Abe Faces an Uphill Battle to Revise Japan’s Constitution,
ORDER
FROM
CHAOS
(Dec.
15,
2018),
BROOKINGS:
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/15/why-shinzo-abefaces-an-uphill-battle-to-revise-japans-constitution/.
11. Compare DAI NIHON TEIKOKU KENPŌ [MEIJI KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art.
1 (Japan), with NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 1 (Japan).
12. ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 42-43, 396-98 (Ashibe explains that the power to
amend the Constitution originates from constituents’ power. The power to amend the
Constitution cannot be used to take away the people’s sovereignty or their
fundamental human rights). See MATSUI, supra note 2, at 38-41.
13. ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 42.
14. Id. at 396; NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], arts. 9, 10-40
(Japan) (Article 9 is the peace clause and Articles 10-40 are the provisions about the
people’s human rights.).
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exercised that power. The National Diet consists of two houses: the
House of Representatives and the House of Councillors. 15 Ordinarily,
politics is left in the hands of the representatives in both houses.
To understand Japanese sovereignty and the relationship between
the people and the representatives, it is necessary to consider how
Japanese constitutional studies reflect French constitutional studies.
Ashibe explains that in the Japanese Constitution, the term authority
refers to national sovereignty established by the French Constitution
of 1791, whereas the term power refers to people sovereignty
established by the French Constitution of 1793.16 Ashibe’s discussion
focuses on Yasuo Sugihara and Yōichi Higuchi’s views on sovereignty.
Sugihara’s work examines Raymond Carre´ de Malberg’s theory,
which positioned the Constitutions of 1791 and 1793 as rivals. 17 On
the other hand, Higuchi examines Georges Burdeau’s and other French
constitutional scholars’ work. 18
Japanese constitutional studies have been influenced by U.S.,
French, and German constitutional studies. Professor Yōichi Higuchi
argues that the people originally had the constituent power to establish
the current Constitution when it was instituted. 19 Once the provisions
were fixed into the constitution, the constituent power froze, and it
reactivates only on a few rare occasions, such as when the people make
an amendment. 20 French constitutional scholars in Japan argue that the

15. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 42 (Japan).
16. ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 40-43; Yasuo Hasebe, Constitutional Borrowing
and Political Theory, 1 INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 224, 228, 230.
17. See Hasebe, supra note 16, at 226-27, 227 n.4. See generally Olga Bashinka,
Raymond Carré de Malberg and the Interpretation of Sovereignty in the Belgian
Constitution, 35 J. OF CONST. HISTORY 149 (2018) (discussing Carré de Malberg’s
theory on sovereignty and views on referendums).
18. MIYOKO TSUJIMURA, FRANSU KENPŌ TO GENDAI RIKKENSHUGI NO
CHŌSEN [THE FRENCH CONSTITUTION AND THE CHALLENGE OF MODERN
CONSTITUTIONALISM] 163-67 (2010) (addressing Higuchi and Sugihara’s views and
noting that their views are less conflicting than they appear).
19. YŌICHI HIGUCHI, KINDAI RIKKENSHUGI TO GENDAI KOKKA [MODERN
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND NATION] 302 (Keiso Shobo 1973) [hereinafter HIGUCHI,
KINDAI RIKKENSHUGI].
20. Id. at 302-04; see also YASUO SUGIHARA, KOKUMIN-SHUKEN TO KOKUMINDAIHYO-SEI [THE NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY PRINCIPLE AND REPRESENTATIVE
REGIMES] 319-326 (Yuhikaku 1983) [hereinafter SUGIHARA, KOKUMIN-SHUKEN]
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dichotomy of Professor Raymond Carre´ de Malberg is too simplistic,
but they admit that de Malberg’s distinction has helped understand how
the Japanese Constitution first reflected the French Constitution of 1791
and then of 1793. 21 For example, one of the leading French
constitutional scholars in Japan, Miyoko Tsujmira, explains that the
battle between Higuchi and Sugihara in the 1970s epitomizes academic
research on sovereignty. 22
Japanese constitutional studies reveal that the Japanese
Constitution considers authority to be more important than power, but
the representatives shall reflect the people’s diverse perspectives. 23 The
idea of having both semi representatives 24 and sociological
representatives 25 has been developed to connect people with politics.
The role of semi representatives is to convey the will of the voters to
the people’s representatives in parliament. 26
Sociological
representatives, however, are selected by voters through partisan
elections. 27 Japanese constitutional studies are now studying how to
practice democracy by utilizing semi and sociological representatives.
However, Japanese constitutional studies face certain issues: how to
assure that the people’s voice reaches parliament, particularly when that
voice is difficult to define and assess, and how to allocate the
parliamentary seats to adequately reflect the people’s vote. 28

(summarizing Higuchi’s argument and explaining Sugihara’s disagreements);
MATSUI, supra note 2, at 39.
21. ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 43 (discussing the contrast between the French
Constitution of 1791 and of 1793).
22. See TSUJIMURA, supra note 18, at 163-170.
23. NONAKA ET AL., KENPŌ I, supra note 1, at 36-41.
24. NONAKA ET AL., KENPŌ II, supra note 5, at 59-63; see also YŌICHI HIGUCHI,
HIKAKU KENPŌ [COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTION] 475 (1992) (Japan) (explaining that
Adhémar Esmein defines semi representative as requiring parliament to reflect the
people’s will); YASUO SUGIHARA, KENPŌ I [CONSTITUTION I] 147-50 (Yuhikaku
1987) (Japan) [hereinafter SUGIHARA, KENPŌ I].
25. NONAKA ET AL., KENPŌ II, supra note 5, at 60-61.
26. HIGUCHI, HIKAKU KENPŌ, supra note 24, at 474-75.
27. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 68, 153-54.
28. HIGUCHI, HIKAKU KENPŌ, supra note 24, at 475.
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B. How to Understand Sovereignty in Japan
Sovereignty changed from the Emperor to “we the people” under
the current Constitution. Additional research is needed to explain how
a constitutional amendment could change the nature of sovereignty.
Nonetheless, a review of renowned academic discussions regarding
sovereignty in Japanese constitutional studies illustrates how Japanese
scholars have incorporated the French constitution into the Japanese
model.
Professor Higuchi contends that people’s sovereignty is the
constituent power, and it serves as the basis of legitimacy for
government. 29 Historically, citizens resisted the monarchy through
revolutions. The French Constitution of 1791 differentiated between
revising the entire constitution and partially amending it. 30 Although
the French Constitution of 1791 provided for complete revision as a
theoretical possibility, it provided a method for only partially amending
the Constitution.31 In general, the express inclusion of people’s
sovereignty and constituent power into a constitution provides
legitimacy for a government. Professor Higuchi fears that the Japanese
government has abused its legitimacy in justifying majoritarian
decisions by claiming it acts in the name of people’s sovereignty, which
destroys the rule of law. 32 Higuchi emphasizes the importance of
human rights and opposes the arbitrary exercise of governmental
power. 33 He argues that people’s sovereignty should comprise the basis
of legitimacy. 34
In contrast, Professor Sugihara believes that people’s sovereignty
means governmental power itself, noting that the people have actual
power to govern themselves. 35 Although Professor Higuchi believes
sovereignty is constituent power itself, Professor Sugihara places
constituent power outside the scope of sovereignty. In Professor

29. HIGUCHI, KINDAI RIKKENSHUGI, supra note 19, at 301-02; see also MATSUI,
supra note 2, at 39.
30. HIGUCHI, KINDAI RIKKENSHUGI, supra note 19, at 301.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 296-97; see also SUGIHARA, KOKUMIN-SHUKEN, supra note 20, at 324.
33. HIGUCHI, KINDAI RIKKENSHUGI, supra note 19, at 296-97.
34. SUGIHARA, KOKUMIN-SHUKEN, supra note 20, at 324-25.
35. Id. at 325-36; MATSUI, supra note 2, at 39.
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Sugihara’s opinion, sovereignty is a legal principle to explain
attribution, to whom sovereignty belongs; people, as the collective will
of a nation, should be central to final decision making. 36 Sugihara
argues that power should be democratized because otherwise, human
rights may be violated. 37 In Japan, a dramatic and rapid change among
social classes has shifted focus from the nation to the people’s
constitution. 38
In examining the change from the previous constitution to the
current Constitution, both Professor Higuchi and Professor Sugihara’s
arguments represent a conflicting understanding of sovereignty and
how constituent power relates to it. Today, however, their arguments
may not seem incongruous because they share similar concerns, such
as how majoritarian decision making violates human dignity.39
Professor Nobuyoshi Ashibe is concerned that constituent power is
unlimited power and is left in the hands of the ruling administration. 40
C. A National Referendum’s Binding Power
Although it may be impossible to assess whether the Constitution
precisely reflects the will of the people, examining the voting rate may
shed some light. Japanese constitutional scholars worry that most
people are indifferent to national politics. 41 Accordingly, a national
referendum may seem like a better alternative because it calls for the
people’s direct participation on a political issue. The Japanese
Constitution, however, does not contain a provision that allows a
national referendum except for a few provisions in special situations:

36. YASUO SUGIHARA, KENPŌ II [CONSTITUTION II] 176 (Yuhikaku 1989)
[hereinafter SUGIHARA, KENPŌ II]; see also TSUJIMURA, supra note 18, at 164-66.
37. SUGIHARA, KOKUMIN-SHUKEN, supra note 20, at 334-36.
38. SUGIHARA, KENPŌ I, supra note 24, at 147-63.
39. TSUJIMURA, supra note 18, at 168 (discussing Sugihara and Higuchi’s views
and how Ashibe’s argument incorporates both).
40. ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 396-97 (arguing there should be limits on
constitutional amendments).
41. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 147-48 (discussing the difficulty of defining
the people’s will and evaluating election results in a manner that allows it to be
sufficiently reflected in the parliament).
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deciding on a constitutional amendment 42 and “a special law, applicable
only to one local public entity.” 43
In Japan, one of the famous academic discussions considers
whether the current Constitution allows for a national referendum with
binding power. 44 Generally, a national referendum with binding power
is not allowed because it conflicts with sovereignty and the Japanese
Constitution does not express any procedure for conducting it. 45 Under
the current framework, representatives serve in the parliament, the
Diet. 46 Article 41 of the Japanese Constitution provides that lawmaking powers belong solely to the Diet. 47 A national referendum with
binding power would contradict Article 41. However, as mentioned
above, the Constitution expressly provides some exceptions, such as a
constitutional amendment.
Professor Hideki Moto is wary of utilizing a national referendum
for a specific issue because it may be used as an excuse to justify
enacting one of the ruling party’s policies. 48 Moto’s concern is that the
outcome of a national referendum can be easily abused because of the
people’s indifference to national politics. Similarly, Professor Kosuke
Fukui argues that in a parliamentary system, political elites often use
national referendums to advance their own will. 49
One of the current problems Japanese constitutional scholars are
concerned with is that the people’s indifference to politics has led
representatives to neglect the will of the voters. Currently, political
parties do not function well enough to identify dynamic conflicts among
the people. Even if not legally binding, a national referendum is more
likely to be used to justify an unconstitutional motive of the cabinet.
42. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 96 (Japan).
43. Id. art. 95.
44. NONAKA ET AL., KENPŌ II, supra note 5, at 10-14 (arguing that a recall
system for representatives is not possible under the Japanese Constitution merely
because of what representatives say during discussions in the parliament).
45. Some scholars believe a national referendum is possible. Toyoji Kakudo,
Chokusetu Minshusei [Direct Democracy], in NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, HŌRITSU GAKUNO
KISO CHISHIKI [BASIC OF LAW STUDIES] 9 (1969).
46. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], ch. IV (Japan).
47. Id. art. 41; see MATSUI, supra note 2, at 66.
48. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 149.
49. KOSUKE FUKUI, KOKUMIN TOHYŌSEI [NATIONAL REFERENDUM] 225-26
(2007).
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Even if the Japanese people are not allowed to hold a national
referendum with legal binding power, they should be given an
opportunity to review negotiations or agreements between the
representatives to determine whether the political parties involved
deserve their trust. As the United Kingdom’s (UK) “Brexit” has
proven, constitutional scholars should be vigilant because there is a
mismatch between the voice of the voters and the majority in the
parliament. 50
Political indifference is a serious issue, which
necessitates revitalizing public deliberation to encourage a more active
discussion in the Diet. 51
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RECALL SYSTEM
AT THE CENTRAL AND LOCAL LEVEL
The current Japanese Constitution applies indirect democracy; it
implements direct democracy only on a few exceptional occasions.
Since representatives work for all Japanese people, once elections are
over, voters cannot recall their politicians. 52 Unlike central politics in
Tokyo, the Governor and representatives in local parliaments face a
recall system under the Local Government Act. 53 The difference
between the central and local governments helps explain the
relationship between Japanese voters and their representatives.
A. Ability of Japanese Living Abroad
to Engage in the Judge Recall System
Five types of courts make up the Japanese judicial system: (1) the
Supreme Court, (2) High Courts, (3) District Courts, (4) Family Courts,
50. See generally Ian McEwan, Brexit, The Most Pointless, Masochistic
Ambition in Our Country’s History, Is Done, GUARDIAN (Feb. 1, 2020, 1:00AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/feb/01/brexit-pointless-masochisticambition-history-done (discussing how the Brexit referendum played out).
51. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 149 (arguing that if a national referendum
is to be carried out, sufficient information should be provided to the public).
52. See SUGIHARA, KENPŌ I, supra note 24, at 144 (noting one of the
characteristics of a pure representative system is that if we understand the elected
legislature as the sole decision maker and emphasize national sovereignty, then the
other system of direct democracy—popular sovereignty—is excluded).
53. Chihō Jichi Hō [Local Autonomy Act], Law No. 67 of 1947, arts. 74-88
(Japan).
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and (5) Summary Courts. 54 The Supreme Court is the highest judicial
body in the Japanese system; it is comprised of fifteen justices, one of
which serves as the Chief Justice. 55 The only public officials that the
people are allowed to reevaluate are these fifteen Supreme Court
justices; the review process occurs during the first general election of
the members of the House of Representatives following the justices’
appointments and every ten years thereafter. 56 This exception allows
the public to recall judges.
Representatives, like judges, are public servants, 57 and a similar
review process should be afforded to Japanese people to reevaluate their
representatives. As the Japanese Constitution states, Japanese people
“have the inalienable right to choose their public officials and to dismiss
them.” 58 However, the Japanese Constitution does not provide specific
procedural directions. Thus, the legislature’s drafting of laws has
sometimes failed to serve the public. For example, in May 2019, the
Tokyo District Court held that the legislature infringed the
constitutional rights of Japanese citizens living outside of Japan by
denying their ability to participate in reviewing the performance of
Supreme Court Justices. 59 Japanese citizens living abroad sued the

54. Saibansho Hō [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, arts. 6, 15, 23, 31-2, 32
(Japan).
55. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 6(2) (Japan); Supreme
BRITANNICA,
Court
of
Japan,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Supreme-Court-of-Japan (last visited Mar. 2,
2020). In general, the people do not play any role in the selection of judges. Judges in
inferior courts are “appointed by the Cabinet from a list of persons nominated by the
Supreme Court.” NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 80 (Japan). The
Cabinet appoints all judges except the Chief Justice. Id. art. 79. The Emperor appoints
the Chief Justice. Id. art. 6(2). Only the fifteen Justices that make up the Supreme
Court are reviewed under a national examination. Id. art. 79(2).
56. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 79 (Japan).
57. Id. art. 15(2).
58. Id. Sugihara believes the Constitution demands direct democracy (a recall
system) for all public officials based on Article 15(2). Moreover, Article 15,
paragraph 1, requires that the people have a system for pursuing political
responsibility. SUGIHARA, KENPŌ II, supra note 36, at 168. See MATSUI, supra note
2, at 41.
59. Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] May 28, 2019, Heisei 30 (gyo wa)
no. 143, Heisei 30 (wa) no. 11936, Lex/DB no. 25570333.
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government 60 under the State Redress Act, which allows plaintiffs to
recover damages caused by illegal government action. 61 The plaintiffs
argued that Japanese living abroad could not exercise their
constitutional rights to review Supreme Court Justices. 62 The plaintiffs
were registered voters; however, they could not review justices
“because they were living abroad and were not sent ballots.” 63 The
Tokyo District Court held that Japanese people share equal voting
power, but it may be restricted for unavoidable reasons. 64
Previously, in 2011, the Tokyo District Court expressed its
suspicion about the constitutionality of not having a system in place for
allowing voters abroad to exercise their constitutional rights in regard
to reviewing the performance of justices. 65 In the Japanese justice
review system, voters go to the House of Representative’s polling
station and receive a sheet with the justices’ names. 66 If voters are not
satisfied with the performance of a specific justice, they write “X” in a
blank space above that justice’s name to signal that they wish to dismiss
the justice. 67 The government argued that legislators have wide
discretion to establish review systems and that in this specific case, the
60. Sakura Murakami, Tokyo District Court Holds First Hearing on Expats’
Right to Vote on Supreme Court Justices, JAPAN TIMES (June 11, 2018),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/06/11/national/tokyo-district-court-holdsfirst-hearing-expats-right-vote-supreme-court-justices/#.XizNdy2ZM0p.
61. Kokka Baishō Hō [State Redress Act], Law No. 125 of 1947, art. 1(1)
(Japan).
62. Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] May 28, 2019, Heisei 30 (gyo wa)
no. 143, Heisei 30 (wa) no. 11936, Lex/DB no. 25570333 (“Failure to give citizens,
age 18 or above, who live abroad, the opportunity to exercise the right of national
examination is to guarantee the right as a unique right to some people and to violate
equal opportunity to exercise the same right to others. . . . It also violates Article 22 (2)
of the Constitution, which guarantees the freedom to travel abroad, because it restricts
their right only for living abroad.”).
63. Murakami, supra note 60.
64. Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] May 28, 2019, Heisei 30 (gyo wa)
no. 143, Heisei 30 (wa) no. 11936, Lex/DB no. 25570333 (“[I]t is reasonable to
understand that the constitution guarantees equal opportunity to exercise the right of
examination in the national examination, that is, to vote.”).
65. Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] April 26, 2011, 2136 HANREI
JIHŌ [HANJI] 13 (Japan).
66. Saikō Saibansho Kokumin Sinsa Hō [Law of the People’s Examination of
the Supreme Court Judges], Law No. 136 of 1947, arts. 12, 14, 15 (Japan).
67. Id. art. 15.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2020

13

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 50, No. 2 [2020], Art. 5
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

430 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50
legislators did not have enough time to go through the process of
sending the ballots to Japanese citizens abroad. 68 However, the district
court rejected the government’s argument and found that the
legislature’s inaction “possibly violated the Constitution although [the
court] did not grant compensation to the plaintiffs.” 69 Ultimately, in
2019, the Tokyo District Court condemned the legislature for failing to
provide opportunities for justice review to Japanese citizens residing
abroad because of its unreasonable delay and declared the practice
unconstitutional. 70
B. Legislative Action on Voting Rights for Japanese Abroad
Before analyzing the Tokyo District Court decision, it will help if
we examine similar voting rights cases. The Constitution declares the
principle that voters have equal rights, 71 and the Public Office Election
Act provides a detailed procedure for voting. 72 In 1998, the Public
Office Election Act was revised to enable elections outside of Japan.73
Until 1998, voters living outside of Japan could exercise voting rights
only in elections for “proportional representation in the House of
68. Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] April 26, 2011, 2136 HANREI
JIHŌ [HANJI] 4 (Japan); Editorial: Indictment of Diet Inaction Over Rights to Review
SHIMBUN
(June
4,
2019,
3:35
PM),
Justices,
ASAHI
http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201906040042.html [hereinafter Editorial].
69. Editorial, supra note 68; Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] April
26, 2011, 2136 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 1, 5, 8, 15, 18 (Japan).
70. Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] May 28, 2019, Heisei 30 (gyo wa)
no. 143, Heisei 30 (wa) no. 11936, Lex/DB no. 25570333.
71. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], arts. 14, 44 (Japan).
72. See generally Kōshoku Senkyo Hō [Public Office Election Act], Law
No. 100 of 1950 (Japan) (laying out qualifications, procedures, and special provisions
for voting). See MATSUI, supra note 2, at 42 (“[A]ll adult citizens are granted the right
to vote by the Public Office Election Age,” except “[t]hose who have committed
crimes and are imprisoned” and “[t]hose who have committed election law
violations.”).
73. Shigenori Matsui, The Voting Rights of Japanese Citizens Living Abroad,
5(2) INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 332, 332 (2007). This revision was further affirmed by the
Supreme Court in a 2005 decision clarifying that the resident status of a Japanese
citizen cannot be used to limit their voting rights. Yuichiro Tsuji, Disparidade do
valor do voto e revisão judicial no Japão [Vote Value Disparity and Judicial Review
in Japan], 5(2) J. OF CONST. RES. 57, 82 (2018) (Braz.) [hereinafter Tsuji, Vote Value
Disparity]. See MATSUI, supra note 2, at 43-44.
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Representatives and the House of Councillors.” 74 Voters living outside
of Japan could not exercise their voting rights in elections in single-seat
constituencies for the House of Representatives and for the election
district, which is conducted in all of the forty-seven prefectures for the
House of Councillors. 75
In 2005, the Supreme Court held that such a system for voters
outside of Japan was unconstitutional under the Public Office Election
Act and under the State Redress Act. 76 The Supreme Court explained
that voting rights may only be restricted for justifiable reasons. 77 One
justifiable reason is that without restricting voting rights, it is
impossible or remarkably difficult to maintain fair elections and to help
voters exercise their right to vote. 78 Articles 43(2), 44, and 47 give the
Diet discretion to structure electoral systems; 79 however, the
legislature’s discretion to shape the process does not mean it can refuse
to act, thus it would not easily qualify as a justifiable reason. The
Japanese Supreme Court noted that restricting voters’ rights would be
illegal under the State Redress Act only if the statute expressly infringes
on citizens’ constitutional rights or if legislative action is expressly
required to protect voters’ constitutional rights but the legislature fails
to act. 80 After this case, the Public Office Election Act was revised.
74. Matsui, supra note 73, at 333. See MATSUI, supra note 2, at 43-44.
75. Tsuji, Vote Value Disparity, supra note 73, at 82-83. Today, the electoral
system has changed. Tottori and Shimane prefectures are merged into one, and
Tokushima and Kochi prefectures are merged into one because of the principle of
equality in the Japanese Constitution. In a 2005 decision, all the representative seats
were distributed among the forty-seven prefectures in accordance with the population.
Id. at 71.
76. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 14, 2005, Heisei 13 (Gyo Tsu) no. 82, 83,
(Gyo Hi) no. 76, 77, 59(7) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 2087
(Japan). See MATSUI, supra note 2, at 43-44.
77. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 14, 2005, Heisei 13 (Gyo Tsu) no. 82, 83,
(Gyo Hi) no. 76, 77, 59(7) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 2087
(Japan).
78. Id. (“Such unavoidable grounds cannot be found unless it is deemed to be
practically impossible or extremely difficult to allow the exercise of the right to vote
while maintaining fairness in elections without such restrictions.”).
79. Id. (“Thus, the Constitution basically leaves it to the Diet’s discretion to
decide the specific mechanism of the election system applicable to members of each
House.”).
80. Id. (“In cases where it is obvious that the contents of legislation or legislative
omission illegally violate citizens’ constitutional rights or where it is absolutely
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Currently, voters can visit the Japanese embassy or vote via mail.81
Both the 2005 and 2019 decisions demonstrated that people living
outside of Japan could not exercise their constitutional right to review
the performance of justices. Additionally, in 2019, the Tokyo District
Court held the legislature was negligent for its inaction that prevented
the plaintiffs from participating in reviewing the performance of
justices during the 2017 election of the House of Representatives. 82
As the 2005 Supreme Court and the 2019 Tokyo District Court
decisions explain, the legislature enjoys wide discretion in determining
the structure of the national examination system. 83 Under Japanese
constitutional studies, it is unconstitutional to adopt a recall system
because representatives are independent of the voters in electoral
districts; representatives serve as public officers for all of Japan. 84 As
Part I explained, national sovereignty places too much emphasis on
legitimacy (authority), which may promote people’s current
indifference to politics and may allow the legislature to easily break its
commitments to the public once elected. Some Japanese scholars on

necessary to take legislative measures to assure the opportunity for citizens to exercise
constitutional rights and such necessity is obvious, but the Diet has failed to take such
measures for a long time without justifiable reasons, the legislative act or legislative
omission by Diet members should exceptionally be deemed to be illegal for the
purpose of Article 1(1) of the Law Concerning State Liability for Compensation.”).
81. Ministry of Internal Affairs and Commc’n, Voting System,
https://www.soumu.go.jp/senkyo/hoho.html (Japan) (last visited Mar. 6, 2020);
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Procedure for Voting Rights for Japanese Living
Abroad, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/toko/senkyo/flow.html (Japan) (last visited
Mar. 6, 2020).
82. Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] May 28, 2019, Heisei 30 (gyo wa)
no. 143, Heisei 30 (wa) no. 11936, Lex/DB no. 25570333.
83. See Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] May 28, 2019, Heisei 30
(gyo wa) no. 143, Heisei 30 (wa) no. 11936, Lex/DB no. 25570333; NIHONKOKU
KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], arts. 41, 43 (Japan); Saikō Saibansho
[Sup. Ct.] Sept. 14, 2005, Heisei 13 (Gyo Tsu) no. 82, 83, (Gyo Hi) no. 76, 77, 59(7)
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 2087 (Japan).
84. See MATSUI, supra note 2, at 41-42 (“Even though the Constitution also
mentions the right to dismiss public officials, the Public Office Election Act does not
allow voters to dismiss their representatives.”); see also Id. at 42 n.7 (“[S]ome argue
that citizens should be allowed to dismiss their representatives if the latter violate
mandates of the voters. However. most academics tend to believe that since the Diet
members are representatives of all of the people, they should not be dismissed by
voters from a single election district, even if the district is their own.”).
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the French Constitution have tried to understand the Japanese
Constitution by studying the French Constitution of 1791’s perspective
on popular sovereignty. This perspective was meant to heighten voters’
awareness that politics is integral to their ordinary lives. However, as
far as Professor Moto is concerned, the ruling party may use the
outcome of the recall system with non-binding power to justify the
majoritarian decision. 85
C. How the Recall System Functions at the Local Level
It is unconstitutional to adopt a recall system for the legislature,
unless the system is at the local governmental level. However, the
Local Government Act has established a recall system in the current
Constitution.86 The Meiji Constitution does not contain any chapters
or provisions regarding local government. 87 The president of the
prefecture comes from the central government. 88 Chapter 8 of the
current Constitution contains four provisions announcing the autonomy
of local government. 89 The Constitution grants local government
decision making power. 90 Local government functions as the school of
democracy in Japan. The Local Government Act includes the details of
how that autonomy is to operate. 91 Most constitutional scholars have
provided descriptive explanations about the purpose of local
government democracy but have failed to explain the core of local
government autonomy. 92
85. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 149.
86. Chihō Jichi Hō [Local Autonomy Act], Law No. 67 of 1947, arts. 74-88
(Japan).
87. See DAI NIHON TEIKOKU KENPŌ [MEIJI KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan).
88. Fuken-sei [Prefectural System], Law No. 1 of 1888 (Japan) (Under the Meiji
Constitution, the Ministry of Interior appoints the governors of prefectures.).
89. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], ch. VIII (Japan).
90. Id.
91. See generally Chihō Jichi Hō [Local Autonomy Act], Law No. 67 of 1947
(Japan); HIROSHI OHTSU, BUNKEN KOKKA NO KENPŌ RIRON [CONSTITUTIONAL
THEORY OF THE DECENTRALIZED STATE] 2-7 (Yushindo 1957) (Japan) (discussing
local autonomy and the dispute about its meaning among scholars, while also noting
that the Japanese Supreme Court has not clearly defined what it means in practice).
92. ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 86; OHTSU, supra note 91, at 2-13 (explaining that
the core refers to the aspects of local government autonomy that may not be infringed
upon).
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Similar to the European Union, in Japan, the principle of
subsidiarity works in defining the relationship between the central and
local government. 93 This principle advocates that social and political
tasks should first be dealt with by the smallest capable authority, such
as by individual members of the public, and a larger authority should
step in only once the task exceeds the capabilities of the smaller
authority. 94
In Japanese central politics, representatives are elected to the Diet
and among their responsibilities is to pass, modify, or abolish statutes.
Only the Diet possesses law-making power. The Prime Minister is
nominated “from among the members of the Diet” 95 and appointed by
the emperor. 96 The Prime Minister is the leader of the cabinet and has
the power to appoint and remove ministers from the cabinet. 97 More
than half of the ministers should be members of the Diet. 98 Thus, in
Japan, the ruling party manages the cabinet under a parliamentary
system. In Japan, the leader of the ruling party is the Prime Minister.99
Members of the Diet can draft bills, but the cabinet may also submit

93. OHTSU, supra note 91, at 1-6; MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 250; KOJI
SATO, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION] 546 (Seibundo 2011) (Japan); Eeva Pavy, Fact Sheets
on the European Union, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 2 (Feb. 2020),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.2.2.pdf (“The general aim of the
principle of subsidiarity is to guarantee a degree of independence for a lower authority
in relation to a higher body or for a local authority in relation to central government.
It therefore involves the sharing of powers between several levels of authority, a
principle which forms the institutional basis for federal states. When applied in the
context of the European Union, the principle of subsidiarity serves to regulate the
exercise of the Union’s non-exclusive powers. It rules out Union intervention when
an issue can be dealt with effectively by Member States at central, regional or local
level and means that the Union is justified in exercising its powers when Member
States are unable to achieve the objectives of a proposed action satisfactorily and
added value can be provided if the action is carried out at Union level.”).
94. Pavy, supra note 93. See generally Yuichiro Tsuji, Local Autonomy and
Japanese Constitution - David and Goliath, 8(2) S. KOR. LEGIS. RES. INST. J. OF L.
AND LEGIS. 43 (2018) (discussing how local autonomy functions in Japan and arguing
for financial independence from the central government).
95. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 67 (Japan).
96. Id. art. 6.
97. Id. arts. 66, 68.
98. Id. art. 68.
99. See id. ch. V.
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bills to the Diet. 100 Additionally, under Article 7 of the Constitution,
the cabinet has unilateral power to dissolve the lower house (the House
of Representatives). 101
Unlike at the central government level, voters directly choose the
president of the local government and the members of local
parliament. 102 However, one way the local government follows the
presidential system is by allowing the governor of the local government
to submit a proposed ordinance to the local parliament. 103 Still, the
local parliament may reject the governor’s bill. 104 Although the local
governor may not dissolve the local parliament unilaterally, the
governor may do so if a no-confidence resolution is passed. 105 The
voters may recall a governor and members of the local parliament if
they obtain the requisite number of signatures as set forth below:
Generally, one third is required to pass. However, if the total number
of voters exceeds 400,000 but is less than 800,000, then one sixth of
the number exceeding 400,000 is required. Moreover, if the total is
more than 800,000, then one eight of the excess votes are
required. . . . If the total number [of voters] exceeds 400,000 and is
800,000 or less, the total number of required votes is obtained by the
sum of one third of 400,000 and one sixth of the number exceeding
400,000. If the total number [of voters] exceeds 800,000, the total
number of required votes is obtained by the sum of one third of
400,000, one six of the number exceeding 400,000 [up to 800,000],
and one eight of the number exceeding 800,000. 106

If the signatures are properly and legally submitted to the Election
Administration Commission, then the election for the recall will be held
within sixty days. 107 The voters may recall/dissolve the local
100. Id. art. 72.
101. See id. art. 7.
102. Chihō Jichi Hō [Local Autonomy Act], Law No. 67 of 1947, art. 17
(Japan).
103. Id. arts. 148, 149.
104. See id.
105. Id. art. 178.
106. Id. art. 81; see also Yanina Welp, THE POLITICS OF RECALL ELECTIONS 99100 (2020) (explaining the signature requirements for a recall).
107. Chihō Jichi Hō [Local Autonomy Act], Law No. 67 of 1947, art. 76(3)
(Japan); see, e.g., Nagoya Sigikai rikōru shomei wa hōteisu wo 3213 uwamawaru
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parliament and its members by fulfilling the same signature
requirement. 108 Accordingly, this system represents direct democracy
in practice because it involves a close relationship between the voters
and elected officials of the local government.
This recall system is part of the political battle between the
president and the local parliament in Japan. One example involves
Mayor Takashi Kawamura of Nagoya city. In 2009, Kawamura ran for
Mayor of Nagoya city and proposed a permanent fifty percent reduction
of the local parliament members’ salaries but also opposed the local
parliament’s continued existence. 109 Kawamura argued that the reason
Japanese politics are not modernized is taxes support the local
parliament members’ salaries. 110 As a mayor, Kawamura had no power
to dissolve the parliament unilaterally, thus he collected signatures
directly from voters to dissolve it. 111 The signatures were submitted to
the election administration commission, which ruled that the signatures
were void because most did not satisfy the signature requirements. 112
Consequently, the citizens urged the commission to reevaluate the
signatures. Eventually, the commission determined that the signature

[Nagoya City Council Recall, Signature Exceeds Legal Quota by 3213], NIHON
KEIZAI
SHIMBUN
(Dec.
15,
2010),
https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFD15016_V11C10A2000000/ [hereinafter
Nagoya City Council Recall].
108. Chihō Jichi Hō [Local Autonomy Act], Law No. 67 of 1947, arts. 76(3),
80(3), 81(2), 83 (Japan).
109. THE POLITICS OF RECALL ELECTIONS 105-06 (Yanina Welp & Laurence
Whitehead eds., 2020); see Nagoya sigikai kaisan he rikōru no shomei atsume
hajimaru [Nagoya Municipal Assembly Disbanded, Recall Signature Collection
(Aug.
27,
2010,
3:03
PM),
Begins],
ASAHI
http://www.asahi.com/special/nagoya/NGY201008270003.html; Chunichi Shimbun,
‘Face of Election’ Kawamura of Nagoya Now the Odd Man Out, JAPAN TIMES (Dec.
15, 2012), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/12/15/national/face-of-electionkawamura-of-nagoya-now-the-odd-man-out/#.XmQ3eC2ZM0o [hereinafter ‘Face of
Election’].
110. See Nagoya gin hōshu de saya-ate Sichō vs Jimin nado 3 kaiha [Nagoya,
Rep. Saya = Mayor VS Liberal Democratic Party], Archipelago Region Selection
2019, JIJI (Mar. 16, 2019), https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2019031600291&g=pol
(discussing Kawamura’s efforts to lower municipal taxes and city council salaries,
which political parties disagreed over).
111. See id.
112. Nagoya City Council Recall, supra note 107.
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requirement was met and the local parliament was dissolved.113
Subsequently, the city mayor resigned. 114 Kawamura was reelected
with the majority seats of his new party, Tax Reduction Japan (Genzei
Nippon). 115
III. DECLINING STATUS OF THE POLITICAL PARTY
IN JAPANESE POLITICS
The Japanese Constitution is in the third phase of the German
scholar Heinrich Triepel’s theory regarding countries constitutional and
legal approaches in regulating political party phenomenon: approval
and legalization. 116 Heinrich Triepel sets forth four phases of relations
between parties and the state: the abatement of parties, the ignoring of
parties, the legalization of parties, and the constitutional incorporation
of parties. 117 The Japanese Constitution does not have any provision
tailored to a political party, 118 but there are various legislative measures
that govern parties. In Germany, the Weimar Constitution led to the
loss of democracy through its flawed procedures and allowed the Nazis

113. Nagoya Recall Petition Fails, JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 25, 2010),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2010/11/25/national/nagoya-recall-petitionfails/#.Xm7EO5P0lZ0; see THE POLITICS OF RECALL ELECTIONS, supra note 109, at
105.
114. Nagoya rikōru shomei 22000 nin bun no igi sinsei [Nagoya Recall
Signature, 22000 Complaints Are Filed], NIKKEI (Nov. 30, 2010),
https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFD29033_Z21C10A1CN8000/;
THE
POLITICS OF RECALL ELECTIONS, supra note 109, at 105.
115. Maverick
as
Hell,
ECONOMIST
(Feb.
10,
2011),
https://www.economist.com/asia/2011/02/10/maverick-as-hell; ‘Face of Election’,
supra note 108; Election of Nagoya Mayor 2017, CHŪNICHI (Apr. 24, 2017),
https://www.chunichi.co.jp/senkyo/nagoyashicho2017/.
116. ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 290; NONAKA ET AL., KENPŌ II, supra note 5, at
55; MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 156-57; see also Tsuji, Vote Value Disparity, supra
note 73, at 77.
117. Małgorzata Lorencka, at al., The Constitutionalization Process of Political
Parties in Poland: Party System Evolution After 1918 188-89,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332269303_The_constitutionalization_pro
cess_of_political_parties_in_Poland_Party_system_evolution_after_1918 (last visite
d Mar. 29, 2020).
118. See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan).
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to rule the government. 119 The Japanese Constitution has a possibility
of changing to the Fortified Democracy (Streitbare Demokratie). 120
Fortified Democracy is the idea that democracies “adopt[] certain
measures to defend themselves against being overthrown by
antidemocratic actors.” It was “[t]he fact that the Nazis could rely on
lawful means in their quest for political power [that] made post-war
Germany particularly conscious of the need to protect its re-established
democracy against anti-democratic forces.” 121
The Japanese Constitution expressly protects freedom of
association and thereby the existence of political parties. 122 However,
the Constitution is silent about the private and public character of a
political party. 123 The Constitution authorizes judicial reviews, but it
does not grant any court exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional
cases. 124 Additionally, the Constitution does not adopt a special
procedure to review political parties’ actions that might violate the
political process or try to overthrow the democratic order. 125 Except
for a few cases, the Japanese Supreme Court reviews legal disputes. In

119. See BRIA 21 3 b The German Weimar Republic: Why Did Democracy
Fail?, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOUND.,
https://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-21-3-b-the-german-weimarrepublic-why-did-democracy-fail (last visited Mar. 7, 2020) (“The [Weimar]
Constitution also gave [the president] the power to temporarily suspend constitutional
rights and let the chancellor rule by decree in a “state of emergency.”).
120. Rights and Wrongs Under the ECHR: The Prohibition of Abuse of Rights
in Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights – Chapter 8 Summary,
CAMBRIDGE UNIV. PRESS, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rights-andwrongs-under-the-echr/german-wehrhaftedemokratie/0226944636C4B209AAD6140130E1426F (last visited Mar. 7, 2020)
[hereinafter Rights and Wrongs Chapter 8 Summary] (explaining the term “streitbare
Demokratie”); MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 351.
121. Rights and Wrongs Chapter 8 Summary, supra note 120.
122. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 21 (Japan); MOTO,
KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 351.
123. See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan).
124. Yuichiro Tsuji, Constitutional Law Court in Japan, 66 TSUKUBA J. OF L.
AND POL. 65, 65 (2016); Japanese Government: Supreme Court of Japan,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Supreme-Court-ofJapan (last visited Mar. 7, 2020).
125. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 160. ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 291; See
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan).
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Germany, democracy aims to protect human rights and is successful, 126
but in Japan, it may be abused to justify the majoritarian decision. This
may be because of the two countries’ different histories and
constitutions.127 In Japan, it is not clear what protections democracy is
providing to political parties and what limitations, if any, it is imposing
on them. Regarding Japanese politics, Professor Moto is concerned
with a majority excluding the minority party from the political process
in the name of democracy. 128 In Japan, the possibility of adopting a
referendum presents the following question: Will the referendum prove
that political parties’ function and legitimacy as a medium between the
voters and representatives has declined?
Since the Second World War, Japanese political parties have
competed against each other in a complexly twisted pattern; sometimes
they join together, and other times they separate. 129 The new
Constitution was established in 1947, and the Japanese Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) was formed in 1955; the LDP “has held power
almost continuously since its formation.” 130 The Japanese people have
witnessed severe factional disputes within the LDP, which has centerright and leftist factions. Japanese people have also seen a change of
leadership inside the LDP, as it changed from the leading political party
to the opposition. For example, from 2009 to 2013, there were
significant changes as to the governing political parties. In 2009, the
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) gained control of government. 131
Subsequently, in March 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake
occurred, which was followed by the voters’ disappointment with the

126. See Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], § I translation at http://www.gesetzeim-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html (Ger.).
127. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 351 (Moto thinks that although there is no
provision for Fortified Democracy in the Japanese Constitution, in actuality, such
tactics may still be used in the political arena).
128. Id. at 158-59, 351.
129. Id. at 171.
130. Raymond Christensen, Liberal-Democratic Party of Japan,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Liberal-DemocraticParty-of-Japan (last visited Mar. 14, 2020).
131. Id.
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government’s response to this large-scale natural disaster. 132 In 2012,
the Abe cabinet was formed, and the lower house was dissolved.133
Since then, opposing parties have been unstable and unable to compete
with the ruling party or to reflect the voice of voters. 134 This chapter
reviews the statutes that regulate, activate, and aim to protect political
parties but that do not function well. Perhaps as a result, political parties
are losing their ability to act as a medium between voters and the
legislature.
A. Historical Role of Political Parties in Japan
Before and After the Second World War
After the Shogunate government in the Edo era (from 1603 and
1868), the new Meiji government followed the Prussian Constitution
when drafting the Meiji Constitution by implementing a framework that
would similarly allow strong government leadership. 135 Under the
Meiji Constitution, sovereignty belonged to the emperor, and the
government provided human rights to the people. 136 Thus, the
government reserved the power to restrict human rights under the law.
The Honoratiorenpartei 137 has existed since the Meiji Constitution.138
Under the nondemocratic electoral system, celebrities and political
leaders connected with each other and took over control of the political
132. See Kenneth Pletcher & John P. Rafferty, Japan Earthquake and Tsunami
of 2011, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Japanearthquake-and-tsunami-of-2011 (last updated Mar. 4, 2020).
133. Christensen, supra note 130.
134. See Takuya Miyazato, et al., Naze seiken wo taosenai noka [Why You Can’t
(Dec.
27,
2019),
Defeat
the
Government],
NHK
POL. MAG.
https://www.nhk.or.jp/politics/articles/feature/26402.html (discussing the factors that
have contributed to the current Japanese administration being the longest in the history
of Japan).
135. MAKOTO OHISHI, NIHONKOKU KENPŌ SI 60-61, 74, 139 (Yuhikaku 2005)
(discussing why the government chose the Prussian Constitution as a model instead
of others).
136. See DAI NIHON TEIKOKU KENPŌ [MEIJI KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 1,
ch. II (Japan).
137. This term means a “political party comprised of local or national
DICT.CC,
https://www.dict.cc/germandignitaries.”
Honoratiorenpartei,
english/Honoratiorenpartei.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2020).
138. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 156 (discussing the transformation of
political parties in Japan).
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party, and there was no inner discipline inside the political party to
counteract that. In the 1910s, the democratic movement was
incorporated into the political, 139 social, and cultural spheres; the
movement became known as Taishō Democracy. 140 Taishō was the
posthumous title of the emperor, and Taishō democracy was introduced
by Professor Sakuzō Yoshino through his theory that democracy is the
essence of constitutional politics. 141 In 1925, universal suffrage was
established 142 along with a notorious law, the Maintenance of the Public
Order Act (MPOA). 143 MPOA gave the power to arrest political
offenders, such as socialists, to a specific police force. 144
Immediately after the Meiji Restoration, people from the four major
prefectures (Satsuma, Chōshu, Tosa, and Hizen) monopolized major
roles in government. 145 Taishō Democracy was created to resist
political domination. During this Taishō Democratic era, politicians
tried to establish a people’s political party comprised of general
citizens. Japanese constitutional studies focused on how to achieve a
democratic political system under the Meiji Constitution. In the
May 15 incident of 1932, (called the 511 incident), young naval
military officers intruded into governmental offices and Prime Minister
Tsuyoshi Inukai’s house. 146 During the 511 incident, Prime Minister

139. See OHISHI, supra note 135, at 251-52.
140. SŌICHI SASAKI, RIKKEN HI-RIKKEN [CONSTITUTIONALISM AND NONCONSTITUTIONALISM] 223 (Kōdansha bunko 2016) (Japan) (explaining how Taishō
democracy originated).
141. Id.; OHISHI, supra note 135, at 242 (Ohishi believes the Taishō democracy
movement was not strong enough to change the original governmental structure);
ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 21.
142. Shūgin Senkyo Hō [The Election Law of the Member of the House of
Representatives], Law No. 82 of 1925 (abolished) (Japan) (suffrage applied to males
who had attained at least twenty-five years of age).
143. See Chian Iji Hō [Maintenance of Public Order Act], Law No. 46 of 1925
(Japan).
144. Id. arts. 2-4.
145. Shunsuke
Sumikawa,
The
Meiji
Restoration:
Roots
of Modern Japan (Mar. 29, 1999) (unpublished thesis, Lehigh University),
https://www.lehigh.edu/~rfw1/courses/1999/spring/ir163/Papers/pdf/shs3.pdf
(discussing the consolidation of power achieved by the four prefectures).
146. Jeff Kingston, 1936 Coup Failed, but Rebels Killed Japan’s ‘Keynes’,
TIMES
(Feb.
20,
2016),
JAPAN
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was killed. 147 Then, four years later, on February 26, 1936 (called the
226 incident), young army officers led around 1,400 officers to
overthrow the government; however, even though the coup d’état
failed, militarism developed in Japan. 148 In the 1940s, existing political
parties were dissolved and incorporated into the Imperial Rule
Assistance Association (IRAA or Taisei yokusankai) in the House of
Imperial Diet in the Fumimaro Konoe cabinet. 149 IRAA organized and
unified the will of the Imperial Diet, and it endorsed the Hideki Tōjō
cabinet’s military actions. 150
The history shows the evolving role of political parties in Japanese
government, which was continuously referred to by previous
constitutions despite sovereignty residing with the emperor. Today, the
ruling party organizes the cabinet in the parliamentary system to
maintain democratic legitimacy and stability under the current
Constitution.
Traditionally, political parties were expected to
communicate the people’s conflicting beliefs and wishes in the
parliament. However, the IRAA oppressed political parties. 151 Some
may argue that the current Japanese Constitution is intentionally silent
about the constitutional role and mission of political parties. They may
argue the Constitution is silent because it expected a political party to
arise from the new democratic ideals developing in Japan after the
Second World War, whose capabilities it did not want to restrict.
Currently, the role of political parties is influenced by the two
houses of the Diet. When the current Constitution was established, the
House of Councillors functioned to check and review the lower house,
the House of Representatives. 152 As political parties developed and
governed both Houses of the Diet, the role of the House of Councillors
weakened. 153 As political parties succumbed, their members’ function
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/02/20/commentary/1936-coup-failedrebels-killed-japans-keynes/#.XmVTXZP0l0s.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. SATO, supra note 93, at 12; see also OHISHI, supra note 135, at 248.
150. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 43; SATO, supra note 93, at 12, 60, 62.
151. HIDEKI SHIBUTANI, KENPŌ [JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2ND] 541
(Yuhikaku 2013); SATO, supra note 93, at 12.
152. ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 299-300; SATO, supra note 93, at 441-44; MOTO,
KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 201, 217.
153. ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 289; MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 217.
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as the medium between the voters and the Diet diminished. On the
other hand, the number of unaffiliated voters increased. 154 Unaffiliated
voters do not support any specific political party because they do not
consider politics a central focus of their lives. Such voters do not
believe that there are good political parties to elect because the existing
Japanese political parties frequently change their positions and may do
so simply to join with the one political party that holds the most power.
B. Political Party’s Strong Control
Under a Single-Seat Constituency System
In 1994, an electoral system, called the single-seat constituency
electoral system, was established. 155 Under this system, a political
party may endorse only one official candidate in its electoral district. 156
As political parties received a large amount of financial support, the
leading members, such as those in the LDP, gained power. 157
Simultaneously, the roles of the Secretary General, the Chairperson of
the Policy Research Council, the Chairperson of the General Council,
and the Head of the Election Strategy Headquarters were strengthened;
in the LDP, these roles manage the party’s internal functions, and most
importantly, they endorse the members as political candidates and

154. Tanaka Aiji, Japan’s Independent Voters, Yesterday and Today, NIPPON
(Aug. 16, 2012), https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a01104/japan’s-independentvoters-yesterday-and-today.html.
155. Kōshoku Senkyo Hō [Public Office Election Act], Law No. 100 of 1950,
art. 86 (Japan); The Government of Modern Japan: Elections, ASIA FOR EDUCATORS,
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/japan_1900_elections.htm (last visited Mar. 8,
2020) (“Perhaps the most important result of the LDP’s temporary loss of power was
the coalition government’s reform of the election system, enacted in 1994. The
reformers’ primary goal was to create a system in which there are two main parties
that regularly alternate power, as is the case in the United States. Up until that time,
the Japanese system consisted of one lopsidedly large party (the LDP) dominating
three or four smaller opposition parties that were never able to win control of the
government.”); see also MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 163.
156. Kōshoku Senkyo Hō [Public Office Election Act], Law No. 100 of 1950,
art. 86-2 (Japan) (If a political candidate is endorsed by political party, he or she can
put his or her name on a list of candidates for the proportional representative election).
157. See Masayuki Yuda, How Does Japan Fund Election Campaigns?, NIKKEI
ASIAN REVIEW (Oct. 11, 2017), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Finance/How-doesJapan-fund-election-campaigns.
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distribute money to the members for the next election. 158 Leading party
members can officially endorse who they want as the candidate for their
political party in the single-seat constituency electoral district. 159 The
influential power of these political endorsements has the effect of
pressuring these candidates to follow that political party’s policy. As a
result, candidates tend to mainly consider the political parties’ will, and
not that of the voters.
This reinforces the above-mentioned
constitutional theory that once elected, representatives are independent
from the voters’ will.
The Political Funds Control Act (PFCA) aims to limit the allowable
contributions to a candidate. 160 For example, the candidate may receive
funds through a political party or political association. 161 However, the
political party may only receive up to 20 million yen a year in individual
contributions and up to 100 million yen a year in corporate
contributions from each corporation. 162 PFCA reflects the belief that
political bribery in the late 1980s caused funds to flow primarily
through political parties. 163
Additionally, under the Political Party Subsidies Act (PPSA),
political parties may receive government subsidies 164 for their
158. See generally LDP Constitution: Chapter II Executive Bodies, LIB DEMS,
https://www.jimin.jp/english/about-ldp/constitution/104146.html (last visited Mar.
15, 2020) (discussing the different roles in the LDP and their interrelation).
159. ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 304-05.
160. See generally Seiji Shikin Kisei Hō [Political Funds Control Act], Law No.
194 of 1948 (Japan) (laying out requirements and restrictions of political funding).
161. Id. art. 3 (defining political party and political organization, as well as
laying out their purpose).
162. Id. art. 21-3 The ceiling for a corporation’s contribution depends on the
size of the corporation. Id.
163. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 165; SATO, supra note 93, at 422; Daisuke
Akimoto, Power and Money in Japanese Politics, JAPAN TIMES (Feb. 16, 2020),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/02/16/commentary/japancommentary/power-money-japanese-politics/#.XmV9gC2ZN0s (discussing the
bribery scandals that have shaken Japanese politics and how the PFCA regulates
political party funding).
164. Seitō Josei Hō [Party Subsidies Act], Law No. 5 of 1994, art. 1 (Japan) (“In
view of the importance of the political parties’ function in parliamentary democracy,
this law provides that the state should subsidize political parties with political grants,
and the necessary political party requirements and notifications. . . . By stipulating
procedures for the award of grants and by reporting their uses and taking other
necessary measures, we will promote the sound development of political activities of
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candidates, which come from the people’s taxes. 165 Every year,
Japanese people pay 250 yen for this public fund, which amounts to a
total of approximately 32 billion yen a year. 166 Only eligible political
parties may receive public funding without spending restrictions.167
PPSA public funds compose around seventy to eighty percent of the
income of the ruling and opposing party. 168 Half of the public funds for
political parties are distributed according to the number of
representatives each party has in the Diet and based on the number of
votes the party earned in past elections. 169 Therefore, the majority
party, having earned the majority of votes in past elections, may receive
more funding than other parties. 170 Currently, the statutes governing
political party funding work to maintain the status quo, which benefits
the majority. 171 Like the public funding support system, the single-seat
constituency system reinforces the ruling party’s power. Therefore,
smaller opposition parties have a slim chance of winning control of the
government.

political parties and ensure their fairness and thereby promote the sound development
of democratic politics.”).
165. Id. art. 4(2) (“Political parties should pay special attention to the fact that
the subsidy will be financed by taxes and other precious resources collected from the
people, and should be aware of their responsibilities and should not rely on the
public.”).
166. Id. art. 7. The total is based on the population of Japan, which as of 2017
is 126.8 million (126.8 million times 250 yen equals 31.7 billion yen). Population,
BANK,
Total
–
Japan,
WORLD
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=JP (last visited Mar.
8, 2020).
167. Id. art. 2 (defining political party as it relates to this law).
168. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 167.
169. LIBRARY OF CONG., REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN
ELECTIONS: JAPAN 58 (2019), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/elections/foreigninvolvement/foreign-involvement-in-elections.pdf.
170. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 165-66.
171. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 162.
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C. Political Parties and the Judiciary
The current Constitution does not regulate the conduct of political
parties, 172 and the judiciary refuses to override the autonomy of political
parties; 173 therefore, political parties may make decisions that infringe
upon their members’ rights. The Hakamada case illustrates how the
judiciary has refused to intervene in the internal disputes of political
parties. 174 In Hakamada, the Japanese communist party expelled one
of its members, Satomi Hakamada, and filed a lawsuit to evict him from
his house, alleging that the property belonged to the party. 175 First, the
Supreme Court noted that political party’s disputes that do not directly
relate to the general civic order would fall outside of its jurisdiction.176
Then, the Court reviewed the procedures for expelling and evicting
party members and found that the party’s decision to expel and evict
Hakamada was not illegal. 177 This case illustrates that the judiciary
intervenes in the internal conflicts of a political party only when the
issue implicates the Constitution’s freedom of association provision.
Under the Constitution, a political party must serve as a medium
between the voters and their representatives. 178 Thus, political parties
should bring various perspectives into the parliament. However, this
can be challenging because party leaders exercise control over their
members. Ultimately, the majority party controls the parliament and
weakens the House of Councillors’ role by restricting free spirited
discussion among members. As noted above, although the judiciary

172. See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 21 (Japan). The
Constitution only expresses the freedom of assembly and association. Id.
173. See Jessica Conser, Achievement of Judicial Effectiveness through Limits
on Judicial Independence: A Comparative Approach, 31 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
256, 311 (“In addition to refusing to answer political questions, Japanese courts
generally refuse to answer quasi-political questions.”); see also MOTO, KENPŌ, supra
note 1, at 164; ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 346; SATO, supra note 93, at 420.
174. See generally Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Dec. 20,1988, Showa 60 (o) no.
4, 155, SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHU MINJIHEN [SHUMIN] 405 (Japan) (discussing
the need for organizational independence and freedom).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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may intervene in political party decision making, it prefers to defer to
the party’s decision, unless the dispute raises a constitutional issue.
IV. GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES TO STOP A REFERENDUM
The Japanese judiciary may use constitutional justifications to
prohibit binding and non-binding national referendums. To understand
the extent to which holding a national referendum is possible, it is
helpful to review several judicial decisions regarding local
governments. Even after a national referendum or resolution of the
parliament reaches a certain outcome, the judiciary may use several
legal principles, like estoppel, 179 to prevent the government from
abusing the outcome such as by implementing policies that betray
people’s expectations.
A. Local Ordinance Annulled by the Judiciary
In a classic case of estoppel, a construction company planned to
construct an intermediate treatment facility of waste disposal in
Kii Nagashima city of Mie prefecture. 180 In November 1993, the
company submitted a building plan to the Mie prefecture. 181 The
company’s application to build and operate was granted in May
1995. 182 Before such events, Mie prefecture and Kii Nagashima city
held meetings and consultations in regard to passing a city water quality
ordinance, allegedly to protect water reserves. 183 In March 1994, the
179. Estoppel is “[a] bar that prevents one from asserting a claim or right that
contradicts what one has said or done before, or what has been legally established as
true.” Estoppel, CORNELL LAW, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/estoppel (last
visited Mar. 8, 2020).
180. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 24, 2004, Heisei 12 (gyo tsu) no. 209,
58(9) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 2356 (Japan) (The Supreme
Court concluded that the city should have advised appropriately to maintain water
quality and prevent water shortage. Thus, the Supreme Court remanded to the high
court to review if administrative disposition was illegal in violation of consideration
of the party. On remand, the Nagoya High court held that the city was in violation of
consideration and illegally designated the business company as a business operator
under the local ordinance.).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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Kii Nagashima city parliament passed a city ordinance to regulate
businesses that may cause water pollution or water shortages by
prohibiting them from constructing certain facilities. 184 Later, the city
council found that the company had taken ninety-five cubic meters of
water, thus causing water shortages. 185 Accordingly, the city ordinance
prohibited the company from building the intermediate treatment
facility, despite the fact that the company’s application to build and
operate was previously granted. 186 In fact, the city ordinance was
specifically passed to stop the company from constructing the
intermediate treatment facility of waste disposal in the city. 187
However, the Supreme Court held that Kii Nagashima city should
have given the company an opportunity to be heard and should have
advised it to construct according to the guidelines of the ordinance. 188
The city government must provide a business that has already prepared
for or began its business activities that may be regulated under a new
city ordinance with the opportunity to accept such ordinance and to
agree to abide by and fulfill the conditions thereof, before suspending

184. Id.
185. Id. (“On May 9, 1995, the jokoku appellant responded that 95 kiloliter of
underground water would be consumed per day, and then on May 16, the Council
informed the jokoku appellee of its view that the Facility should be recognized as a
place of business subject to regulation [under the ordinance].”).
186. Id.
187. Id. (“Under such circumstances, the jokoku appellee can be deemed to have
known the fact that the jokoku appellant had already initiated the procedure relating
to the application for permission of the establishment of industrial waste treatment
facility before the establishment of the Ordinance, and have had the opportunity to
consider, through the procedure, what measures should be taken by the town
government to balance the necessity to establish the Facility and the necessity to
protect the water source.”).
188. Id. (“Assuming that, before making the Decision, the jokoku appellee had
the duty to sufficiently consult with the jokoku appellant through the procedure
provided under the ordinance, while taking into account the jokoku appellant’s
position [of having relied on the prior approval to start building] mentioned above,
provide appropriate instructions to the jokoku appellant to correct the expected
amount of water intake for the purpose of protecting water source, by encouraging the
jokoku appellant to limit the amount of underground water to be used for the facility,
and give due consideration not to unreasonably harm the position of the jokoku
appellant. The decision would inevitably be deemed to be illegal if it had been made
in violation of this duty.”).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol50/iss2/5

32

Tsuji: National Referendum and Popular Sovereignty in Japan
NATIONAL REFERENDUM AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN JAPAN

YUICHIRO TSUJI

2020] NATIONAL REFERENDUM AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN JAPAN 449
its activity.189 This case illustrates how the local government may pass
particular local ordinances to specifically target certain businesses or
individuals. However, this case also demonstrates that the judiciary
may ultimately prohibit the local government from passing certain
ordinances that intentionally target a specific business or individual.
B. Local Parliament’s Resolution Violates Relationship of Trust
In another case, a company planned to construct a paper production
plant in Ginoza village in Okinawa prefecture. 190 The company
requested permission from the local government to receive a parcel of
land and to build the production plant. 191 In 1971, the president of the
village made an official statement, approved by the local parliament,
that the village would fully cooperate in building the paper production
plant. 192 The local parliament decided to offer the requested land,
placing the construction of the production plant in motion.193
Subsequently, in 1973, the village elected a new president who objected
to building the plant.194 The new president refused to pay for the plant’s
construction. 195 Accordingly, the company sued the village for
compensatory damages. 196
The Supreme Court held that the village unreasonably and illegally
destroyed the relationship of trust it had created with the company.197
Once the village took an official position with the parliament’s
resolution, endorsing the plant’s construction, the company relied on
this position and began building. 198 Construction had progressed, but
189. Id.
190. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Jan. 27, 1981, Showa 51 (o) no. 1338, 38(1)
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 35 (Japan); see also GYOSEIHOU
HANREI HYAKUSEN 52-53 (7th ed., vol. I 2017) (Japan) (summarizing the paper
production plant case).
191. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Jan. 27, 1981, Showa 51 (o) no. 1338, 38(1)
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 35 (Japan).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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all of a sudden, the new president refused to cooperate and compensate;
this caused the company to suffer monetary loss. The Supreme Court
explained that electing a new president of local government may result
in policy changes; thus, to avoid unreasonable destruction of trust, a
private party should be given reasonable notice of the upcoming policy
changes. 199
C. Local Referendum Regarding U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa
Okinawa constitutes less than one percent of the total land of Japan
where around seventy percent of all U.S. military bases in Japan are
located. 200 Since Okinawa became a Japanese territory in 1972, it has
had frequent conflicts with the central government regarding the
presence of U.S. military bases. Analyzing this issue will illustrate how
the current Constitution addresses local governments’ autonomy.
Article 95 of the Japanese Constitution provides appropriate procedures
for enacting special local laws. 201 However, local governments have
used local referendums to promote specific local policies, instead of
following procedures provided by Article 95. 202
The local referendum process can be completed in two ways:
(1) through the Political Office Election Act 203 and Local Government
Act, 204 by requesting signatures from one-fiftieth of the total voters with
the consent of the local parliament; and (2) through the local parliament
by passing a local ordinance using only the local referendum

199. Id.
200. Justin McCurry, Okinawa Referendum: Everything You Need to Know,
(Feb.
21,
2019,
7:35
PM),
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/22/okinawa-referendum-everythingyou-need-to-know.
201. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 95 (Japan) (“A special
law, applicable only to one local public entity, cannot be enacted by the Diet without
the consent of the majority of the voters of the local public entity concerned, obtained
in accordance with the law.”).
202. SHIBUTANI, supra note 151, at 745.
203. Kōshoku Senkyo Hō [Public Office Election Act], Law No. 100 of 1950
(Japan).
204. Chihō Jichi Hō [Local Autonomy Act], Law No. 67 of 1947, art. 74
(Japan).
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procedure. 205 A local ordinance may set forth the requirements for
voter eligibility, such as age, and residency or citizenship, and may
determine whether the referendum will be legally binding. 206
The government of the Okinawa prefecture has used the local
referendum mechanism to determine whether it should rearrange and
reduce U.S. military bases in Okinawa and whether it should review the
Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement. In December 2018, the central
government proposed that a U.S. military base be relocated to Henoko
bay area in Okinawa. 207 In October 2018, Denny (Yasuhiro) Tamaki
became the governor of the prefecture. 208 In February 2019, Okinawa
held a referendum regarding the relocation of the Futenma U.S. air base
to Henoko. 209 Some local cities strongly opposed holding this
referendum; however, the referendum concluded with over seventy
percent of voters voting against the relocation. 210 As a result, Tamaki
resisted the central government’s plan to relocate the U.S. base to
Henoko bay area and opposed the current Japan-U.S. defense and
security policies. 211 Tamaki argued that the U.S. base is a heavy burden
that rests solely on the people of Okinawa. 212 The result of this local
referendum impacted the central government’s decision making.

205. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 256; SHIBUTANI, supra note 151, at 74748.
206. SHIBUTANI, supra note 151, at 748 (arguing that a local referendum with
binding power is unconstitutional).
207. Justin McCurry, Okinawa Rejects New US Military Base but Abe Vows to
(Feb.
25,
2019,
9:05
PM),
Push
on,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/24/okinawa-referendum-rejects-newus-military-base-but-abe-likely-to-press-on. The central government led by Prime
Minister Abe pushed for this relocation even though the voters of Henoko rejected the
move in a referendum. Id.
208. Mari Yamaguchi, AP Explains: The New Okinawa Governor and US
NEWS
(Oct.
1,
2018),
Military
Bases,
AP
https://apnews.com/d991048b5029481094be35ec600a322a/AP-Explains:-The-newOkinawa-governor-and-US-military-bases.
209. McCurry, supra note 207.
210. Id.
211. Yamaguchi, supra note 208.
212. Gerry Partido, Tamaki Tells Governor US Bases a ‘[B]urden’ to Okinawa,
PNC (Aug. 30, 2019), https://pncguam.com/tamaki-tells-governor-us-bases-aburden-to-okinawa/.
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D. Types of Local Referendum: Permanent or Temporary
There are three types of local referendum. First, as mentioned
above, the Japanese Constitution has a special provision regarding
referendum that is applicable to local governments. It requires the
consent of the majority of the voters of the local public entity involved.
The second type is provided by the statutory referendum in the Local
Government Act, which allows voters to dissolve the local
parliament, 213 recall members of the local parliament, 214 or recall the
governor. 215 The third type involves a local referendum via a local
ordinance. 216
There are two types of local referendums via local ordinance:
(1) temporary referendum and (2) permanent referendum. Temporary
referendum is provided by the Local Government Act. 217 For the
temporary referendum, the local parliament initiates a local referendum
via a local ordinance after receiving a specific proposal from the
governor or members of the local parliament, or a local resident’s
request. 218 Temporary referendums have the advantage of a flexible
design as to the referendum’s theme. Moreover, the referendum’s goals
are clear, allowing voters to deliberate and preventing potential abuse
of the referendum. Even after a local parliament passes an ordinance,
it takes time to determine the theme and requirements, such as voter
eligibility. One negative aspect of a local ordinance is that it may be
too flexible, allowing for manipulation and abuse of the outcome.
For permanent referendum, the local parliament’s resolution
establishes the referendum’s eligibility requirements and procedures

213. Chihō Jichi Hō [Local Autonomy Act], Law No. 67 of 1947, arts. 76(3),
77 (Japan).
214. Id. arts. 79, 80(3).
215. Id. arts. 81(2), 82.
216. Id. arts.12, 74.
217. See id.
218. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 256-57 (arguing that the local governments
should be given sufficient time to establish the framework for a local referendum);
SATO, supra note 93, at 561-62 (arguing that giving a local referendum binding power
would be unconstitutional because it would emphasize direct democracy, while the
Constitution emphasizes representative democracy).
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through ordinance in advance. 219 With the procedure determined in
advance, it takes less time to open a referendum than it would without
the local parliament’s resolution. When the ordinance is accepted, the
referendum will be opened without the local parliament’s resolution.
The negative aspect of this type of permanent referendum is that
without a resolution, the referendum’s requirements might be too
abstract. This might cause controversies, abuse of the referendum
process, and waste of time and resources.
The referendum
administrator has the ultimate discretion to decide whether to hold the
referendum or not. 220 The referendum administrator’s decision
regarding holding the referendum may not be supported by voters,
which may cause potential litigation. Local parliament’s discretionary
power to decide whether to hold the referendum is the key difference
between the permanent and temporary referendums.
E. Local Versus National Agreements
Regarding Nuclear Power Plant Reactivation
In Japan, nuclear power plants generate substantial financial profit
for local inhabitants. At the same time, however, such plants pose risks
to the lives and health of people living near the reactor. Currently, no
statute requires the consent of the local government to reactivate a
nuclear power plant. After the LDP took over the government in 2012,
the Abe cabinet announced that nuclear energy is a key power
supply. 221 Recognizing the importance of nuclear energy production,
new safety regulations, such as the Nuclear Regulation Authority

219. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 256-57; see also Tadashi Ogawa,
Jōsetsugata jumin tōhyo jōrei ni okeru jumin tōhyo no taishō jikō gaitōsei hiroshima
kohan heisei 24nen 5gatu 16hi [Requirement of local ordinance Hiroshima High Ct.
Heisei 24, May 16], 429 JICHI-SOKEN 1, 1-3 (2014).
220. Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Chihō jichi tai ni okeru
jūmin tōhyō ni tsuite [Local Referendum in Local Government],
https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000087296.pdf (Japan) (last visited Mar. 9,
2020).
221. Tom Corben, Nuclear Power in the New Abe Cabinet, DIPLOMAT
(Sept. 20, 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/09/nuclear-power-in-the-new-abecabinet/.
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(NRA), were passed, and those nuclear power plants that met the new
standards were reactivated. 222
Some nuclear power plant operators reached an agreement with the
local government regarding new safety measures for nuclear power
production, such as environmental monitoring, accountability for harm
caused, investigation by the local government, risk communication,
compensation, and obtaining consent before making additions or
changes in the building of the nuclear power plant. This agreement is
not binding, but it forms a foundation for the local government’s
involvement in decision making and helps maintain trust between the
operator and the local people. In April 2018, Japan Atomic Power
Company (APC) reached an agreement with six cities and
municipalities for reactivating the second Tokai nuclear power
reactor. 223 Local government was allowed to engage with the
reactivation process. 224 APC has prepared a plan for the second Tokai
nuclear power reactor’s reactivation. 225 An evacuation plan will be
prepared for approximately one million people who live within a radius
of thirty kilometers from the reactor as an Urgent Protective action
Planning Zone (UPPZ). 226 The previous standard required evacuation
only for up to eight to ten kilometers from the nuclear power reactor as
an Emergency Planning Zone. 227 Expanding the geographic area of an
UPPZ means more inhabitants and local governments are affected by
the reactivation process.
Nuclear power plant operators make reactivation agreements, with
the local government where the reactor is located and with other local
222. Reviewing the Nuclear Regulation Authority, JAPAN ATOMIC INDUS.
FORUM, INC. (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.jaif.or.jp/en/reviewing-the-nuclearregulation-authority/; see NRA’s Core Values and Principles, NUCLEAR REGULATION
AGENCY, http://www.nsr.go.jp/english/e_nra/idea.html (Japan) (last visited Mar. 9,
2020).
223. Local Consent for Nuclear Plant Restarts, JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/04/05/editorials/local-consent-nuclearplant-restarts/#.XjPZpS2ZPOQ.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Nuclear Emergency Preparedness: Frequently Asked Questions, CABINET
OFFICE,
https://www8.cao.go.jp/genshiryoku_bousai/faq/faq.html (Japan) (last visited Mar. 9,
2020).
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governments nearby, regarding various safety measures. 228 “The
agreements stipulate the lines of communication when the plants have
problems, as well as procedures for prior consent to restarting and
modifying reactors or building new ones, though they are not legally
binding.” 229 Therefore, the operators still face prospective litigation
asking for an injunction on operation 230 because these agreements with
nearby local governments are not legally enforceable. Operators face
an important challenge: how to maintain the trust of local inhabitants.
Although a local government has no power to investigate, the
Nuclear Regulatory Authority does. 231 “The NRA is an external bureau
of the Ministry of the Environment. The chairman and commissioners
of the NRA are appointed by the prime minister, with the consent of the
Diet.” 232 The NRA can permit the construction or reactivation of a
nuclear power reactor. 233 In July 2019, eight years after the Great East
Japan Earthquake occurred, the Tokyo Electric Power Company
Holdings (TEPCO) finally decided to abolish the second Fukushima
nuclear power plant. 234 TEPCO owes 16 trillion yen in damages to
compensate victims and 500 billion yen a year to pay for the cost of
shutting down. 235 This case shows the urgent need to grant local
governments the authority to hold local referendums to investigate and
regulate matters that affect the local population, such as nuclear power
plant reactivation.
228. See, e.g., Local Consent for Nuclear Plant Restarts, supra note 223.
229. Id.
230. Genpatsu kadō ibaraki hō shiki ashi-gakari ni [(Editorial) Nuclear Power
Plant Operation Agreement “Ibaraki method” as a Foothold], ASAHI (Apr. 3, 2018),
https://www.asahi.com/articles/DA3S13433526.html (Japan).
231. See generally OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, NUCLEAR LEGISLATION
OECD
AND
NEA
COUNTRIES
(2017),
https://www.oecdIN
nea.org/law/legislation/japan.pdf (discussing nuclear legislation and regulation in
Japan).
232. Id. at 16.
233. Id. at 8.
234. TEPCO Says Will Decommission Fukushima Daini Nuclear Reactor,
KYODO NEWS (July 24, 2019, 9:31 PM),
https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2019/07/e344e64406e2-tepco-says-willdecommission-fukushima-daini-nuclear-reactor.html.
235. TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY, TEPCO INTEGRATED REPORT 2017
13-14, 53 (2017), https://www7.tepco.co.jp/wp-content/uploads/hd05-02-03-002tir2017_01-e.pdf.
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CONCLUSION
With the increasing globalization of politics, culture, and the law,
the scope of sovereignty has narrowed. Over time, people became
increasingly indifferent to politics. Thus, direct democracy may be a
good method for connecting voters with politics. Popular sovereignty
is the principle that authority and power reside with the people.
Legitimacy is given to representatives who are expected to work for all
of the people once elected. Representatives are expected to reflect the
peoples’ diverse perspectives in the parliament and integrate them into
the law. Japanese constitutional studies examine how to assure that the
people’s diverse voice reaches the parliament and how to allocate the
parliamentary seats to adequately reflect the people’s vote. When the
Japanese Constitution was established, it cemented constituent power
as the power to amend, meaning it can be activated only when the
people amend the constitution directly. However, the Constitution
provided a few exceptions such as power to amend the constitution and
power to enact special laws applicable to the local governments.
Mostly, however, only representatives actively participate in politics.
Only the Diet possesses law making power. It is unconstitutional
to hold legally binding national referendums, but a national referendum
with no legal binding power may be available at the level of central
government. Although people may not consider politics as an
important part of their daily lives, they should remain vigilant of
majoritarian abuse over the referendum’s outcome even if it is not
binding. If the referendum results in a mistake, a series of constitutional
defense valves shall be activated to prevent one mistake from leading
to another. As a series of legislative actions are taken but fail, the
judiciary must use a general legal principle in addition to constitutional
principles. If the legislature is paralyzed, the judiciary may intervene
in the political process by holding that legislative inaction is
unconstitutional. If the political process fails, the judiciary is
constitutionally required to check the legislature. One of the reasons
for legislative paralysis is due to the role of political parties. Under the
current Constitution, the political parties are expected to be the medium
between voters and the legislature. By following the political party’s
decisions, members can perform their jobs as representatives.
The history of Japanese politics proves that politicians and scholars
have tried to establish democracy under the previous constitution where
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the emperor was the sovereign. The current Constitution has no
provision specially tailored to regulate political parties’ conduct. The
Japanese Constitution may expect political parties to actively connect
voters with the political process, but if we consider the strong financial
power backing a political leader, that view may prove too optimistic.
In order to prevent financial flow directly to a political candidate,
statutes prescribe how money should pass through the political party.
To stop political bribery, statutes financially support parties with the
people’s general taxes. Still, in a single-seat constituency system, the
political party leader has the power to officially endorse the candidate
in the electoral district. As a result, the representatives usually follow
the majority political party’s decision and tend to ignore the voters’
wishes. However, as the above-mentioned cases illustrate, the judiciary
may, under the Constitution, stop the local parliament from unilaterally
altering decisions. Therefore, the judiciary shall use the Constitution to
prevent the parliament from acting unilaterally without considering the
people’s needs, wishes, or demands.
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